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EXPANDING THE ENVELOPE OF UAS CERTIFICATION:  WHAT IT 
TAKES TO TYPE CERTIFY A UAS FOR PRECISION 
AGRICULTURAL SPRAYING 
J.M. Maddalon*, K.J. Hayhurst*, N.A. Neogi*, H.A. Verstynen†, R.A. Clothier‡  
One of the key challenges to the development of a commercial Unmanned Air-
craft System (UAS) market is the lack of explicit consideration of UAS in the 
current regulatory framework. Despite recent progress, additional steps are 
needed to enable broad UAS types and operational models.  This paper discuss-
es recent research that examines how a risk-based approach for safety might 
change the process and substance of airworthiness requirements for UAS.  The 
project proposed risk-centric airworthiness requirements for a midsize un-
manned rotorcraft used for agricultural spraying and also identified factors that 
may contribute to distinguishing safety risk among different UAS types and op-
erational concepts. Lessons learned regarding how a risk-based approach can 
expand the envelope of UAS certification are discussed.  
INTRODUCTION 
To spur the emerging commercial market for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), the United 
States (U.S.) Congress has directed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take steps to-
ward “safe and routine operation” of commercial UAS in the national airspace system (NAS).1  
Regulatory progress has been made for smaller UAS (< 55 lb) operating in visual conditions;2  
however, those efforts do not include type design and airworthiness requirements for larger and 
more capable UAS operating in non-segregated airspace and beyond the visual line-of-sight of 
the remote pilot.  Those requirements are critical for safe and routine access of all UAS to the 
NAS and are the focus of this paper.   
For conventional aircraft (those with pilots onboard), the risk to people and property on the 
ground from poor vehicle design or maintenance is addressed through airworthiness regula-
tions.3,4  Airworthiness can be broadly defined as the suitability for flight of an aircraft. In civil 
aviation regulations, an aircraft is considered airworthy if the aircraft is compliant with relevant 
technical requirements governing its design and manufacture, and is in a condition for safe flight.  
Airworthiness regulations cover all aspects of the design, manufacture, and maintenance of air-
craft systems and components. International consensus on airworthiness regulations for the broad 
spectrum of UAS types has yet to be reached. An initial approach proposed by some regulators 
was to apply the existing airworthiness framework for conventional aircraft to UAS, with the in-
tent of minimizing change to aviation regulations.5  However, it is now broadly recognized that 
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the “off-the-shelf approach”6 is unlikely to lead to an acceptable regulatory outcome for all UAS 
types.4  
More recently, researchers and regulators have begun exploring risk-based approaches to UAS 
certification.3,7,8  As stated by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), “the regulatory 
framework should not simply transpose the system put in place for manned aviation but must be 
proportionate, progressive, risk based... Only [in] this way can we address the challenges posed 
by the wide variety of drones and their operation...”7 Ideally, a risk-based approach ensures safety 
regulations have a foundation in, and traceability to, the underlying safety-related hazards that 
need to be managed.  The adoption of a risk-based approach “marks a significant change in the 
way aviation safety regulations are developed, becoming proportionate to the risks they aim to 
address.”9 
This paper presents some observations about risk-based certification based on a recent re-
search study of type design requirements for commercial UAS.  The study was undertaken by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with the objective of proposing design 
criteria for a midsize unmanned rotorcraft (1000 lb maximum takeoff weight) used for commer-
cial precision agricultural spraying operations.  The research effort produced prototypes of docu-
mentation needed to support airworthiness certification, including a proposed (or mock) type cer-
tification basis with design standards for the unmanned rotorcraft.10  A type certificate provides 
both airworthiness standards and operating limits for a specific model of aircraft.  
This paper summarizes the study’s findings relevant to pushing forward with a risk-based cer-
tification approach to airworthiness.  The next section provides additional background infor-
mation on the relationship between risk and certification.  The subsequent section covers founda-
tional elements essential to a risk-based approach, starting with revised definitions of hazard se-
verity.  The discussion continues by summarizing the hazards identified for the unmanned agri-
cultural concept of operations (ConOps), and provides examples from the mock certification ba-
sis.  The next section looks at the set of factors that influence safety risk.  These factors may be 
useful in distinguishing the risk of one UAS operation from another.  The final section summariz-
es the observations and lessons learned. 
RISK-BASED CERTIFICATION 
Risk-based certification is an approach in which the requirements from the certification pro-
cess are proportional to the risk (combining likelihood and severity of consequence) of an avia-
tion operation.   Public safety interests associated with commercial UAS operations are the same 
as those for commercial operations of conventional aircraft. However, the primary risks managed 
through airworthiness regulations are different.3,4  For UAS that could endanger the public, air-
worthiness requirements are needed to manage the risk to persons on the ground and in other air-
craft. Whereas for conventional aircraft used for commerce or hire, airworthiness regulations 
serve to protect people onboard the aircraft, with the protection of persons and property on the 
ground being another benefit.  This subtle, yet significant, difference changes the hazard space, 
which permits unique trade-offs in the setting of airworthiness requirements for UAS.4  In addi-
tion, current regulations for airworthiness certification are based on decades of experience and 
extensive historical data on aircraft and system designs, performance, and limitations. Based on 
this data, hazards that require regulation are reasonably well understood.  UAS do not have this 
long history and unmanned aircraft designs are proliferating.  Although the current airworthiness 
standards are based on the likelihood and severity of consequence, these standards rely on as-
sumptions about the hazards of aircraft and its operation.  Alternately, a risk-based approach re-
lies on an explicit identification of hazards for a particular aircraft and operation. Table 1 con-
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trasts some characteristics of airworthiness standards for conventional aircraft with those being 
proposed for risk-based certification of UAS.  The challenge in moving to an explicitly risk-based 
approach is in realizing differences in risks and finding ways to mitigate those risks without un-
duly restricting designs. 
Table 1. Characteristics of Airworthiness Standards for Commercial Operations 
General Characteristics of Existing Airworthiness 
Standards for Conventional Commercial Aircraft 
Expected Characteristics of Risk-based Air-
worthiness Standards for UAS 
Originate from experience with system designs, per-
formance, and limitations 
Will originate from a priori functional and opera-
tional hazard analysis for an aircraft and operation 
Operation agnostic Will be operationally driven 
Based on aircraft designs from 1950’s and 1960’s22  Will not presuppose a reference aircraft 
Focus on protection of people onboard 
Will focus on protection of people on the ground 
and in other aircraft 
Both performance-based safety objectives and pre-
scriptive (technology-centric) requirements 
Will primarily be performance-based safety objec-
tives 
The next section describes the NASA study and the risk-based approach used to propose air-
worthiness criteria for an agricultural rotary wing UAS. The approach included identification of 
the hazards inherent to the UAS and its operation.  Explicitly capturing hazards allowed novel 
aspects of the UAS to be addressed with more flexible thinking about meeting public safety re-
quirements. The research effort produced generalized, over-arching design and performance re-
quirements to manage the risks to acceptable levels (commensurate with the excellent safety rec-
ord of conventional aircraft), while also providing design flexibility needed to allow for innova-
tion and industry growth. This risk-based approach adapts the system safety processes used in the 
certification of the avionics in conventional aircraft to the whole UAS.   
USING RISK TO EVALUATE NOVEL FEATURES 
The airworthiness requirements proposed in the mock type certification basis were largely de-
termined by the hazards and risks that need to be managed for the precision spraying operation. 
Hazard and risk assessment processes are, by their nature, subjective and are dependent on hazard 
severity definitions. The first step in developing the mock certification basis was to consider 
those definitions. 
Hazard Severity Definitions 
In conventional civil aircraft safety assessment, failure conditions that pose a hazard are iden-
tified and then classified according to the severity of the potential consequence: catastrophic, haz-
ardous, major, minor, or no safety effect.11  Definitions of these categories establish what vehicle 
conditions are to be avoided, making the definitions a keystone to a risk-based certification ap-
proach.  Hazards that could prevent safe flight and landing and those that can injure or kill pas-
sengers or crew are always considered catastrophic.  Regulatory guidance for conventional air-
craft aims to reduce the likelihood of those events to acceptable levels. 
Protection of crew and passengers is central to the existing definitions for hazard categories.12 
In a conventional aircraft, hull loss is inextricably tied to catastrophe because loss of life is a real-
istic expectation. In contrast, hull loss of an unmanned aircraft (UA) may pose no hazard to life, 
depending on the operational context.  UAS operations over water or unpopulated areas (e.g., 
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farmland or wilderness) would present little risk to human life because the likelihood of an unfor-
tunate encounter with a human is extremely low.  This fundamental difference in risk has moti-
vated some regulators to use an operation-centric approach to categorizing UAS.2,13 
The difference in risk between conventional aircraft and UAS motivates some degree of tailor-
ing of severity definitions.  To do that tailoring, a number of proposed definitions were reviewed, 
yielding three major premises: protection of people, preservation of aircraft safety margins and 
functional capabilities, and protection of the crew’s ability to perform their safety role.14-16 Pro-
tecting any person from harm, including third parties on the ground and people in other aircraft, is 
obvious and necessary.  Maintaining safety margins is a fundamental engineering concept to al-
low safe operation during emergency situations and unexpected conditions (e.g., a fly away 
event).  Lastly, any condition that could interfere with the pilot and crew’s ability to perform their 
safety roles must be avoided.  These safety roles can be quite different for UAS because the de-
gree to which a UAS pilot and crew can directly affect safety varies significantly across the spec-
trum of UAS types.  A formal ConOps is needed to characterize the specifics of both safety mar-
gins and safety roles for a UAS and its operation.   
The most significant differences between existing hazard severity definitions for UAS and 
those used in the study can be seen in the definition of catastrophic: 
From the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS)14: “Cata-
strophic: Failure conditions that could result in one or more fatalities”   
From the NASA study10: Catastrophic: Failure conditions that are expected to result in: 
(1) fatality or fatal injury to any person; (2) complete loss of safety margins (e.g., fly 
away for a UA); or (3) complete loss of the UAS crew’s ability to perform their safety 
role (e.g., from incapacitation). 
 
The tailored definitions retain the protection of people, but also emphasize the safety role of the 
crew and allow flexibility in setting safety margins commensurate with the UAS and its opera-
tion, making the definitions broadly applicable to UAS. 
UAS for Precision Agriculture Case Study  
The ConOps for the NASA study10 focused on a midsize rotary wing UAS intended to spot 
treat crops in a precision agriculture operation, as shown in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. Concept for Precision Agricultural Application with Unmanned Rotorcraft  
In the ConOps, one UAS is operating with one remote ground control station (GCS) within 
radio line-of-sight (RLOS). The pilot may be within visual line-of-sight (VLOS) or beyond 
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VLOS (BVLOS). Spray operations are limited to a designated operational boundary (Figure 1, 
yellow lines) and an absolute containment boundary (Figure 1, red lines) just beyond the 
operational boundary.  A priori knowledge about crop health is used to identify treatment areas 
(Figure 1, dashed white lines).  The unmanned rotorcraft is expected to operate a few feet above 
crop height, with a maximum altitude of 400 ft.  Constraining the operation to a well-defined 
volume, restricted in altitude and inhabitants, is key to limiting operational risk.   
Using the hazard severity definitions, a functional and operational hazard assessment was 
conducted11, 17 with the goal of evaluating whether the potential consequences of a hazard necessi-
tate mitigation in the form of a design or performance standard.  Only those hazards whose sever-
ity was considered major or worse were targeted for requirements to be included in the mock cer-
tification basis.21  Table 2 lists the primary hazards considered for that purpose. 
Table 2. Primary Hazards for the Unmanned Precision Agriculture Spraying Operation 
Hazards affecting the crew’s ability 
to perform their safety role 
Hazards that pose harm to any 
person 
Hazards that affect aircraft safety 
margins and functional capabilities 
 Loss of command and control (C2) 
link used for contingency manage-
ment (e.g., flight termination) 
 Loss of or degraded electrical power 
in the ground control station for con-
tingency and emergency functions 
 Loss of or degraded electrical power 
subsystems on the UA for contin-
gency and emergency functions 
 Loss or degradation of ground 
control station capability (e.g., loss 
of displays) required for  contin-
gency and emergency functions 
 Loss of or inadequate struc-
tural integrity, especially of 
the rotor system (that could 
lead to release of high energy 
parts) 
 Failure to detect, alert or 
warn, and avoid intruder air-
craft 
 Failure to detect, alert or 
warn, and avoid dynamic or 
other obstacles on the ground 
 Explosion in the powerplant 
or fuel system 
 Failure to recognize and avoid adverse 
environmental conditions  
 Failure to stay within authorized oper-
ational area  
 Loss of pilot situational awareness  
 Loss of or degraded communication 
between pilot and crew 
 Failure to maintain adequate control-
lability, maneuverability, and stability 
 Loss of UAS position and anti-
collision lights (loss of means to be 
seen by other aircraft and observers) 
 Interference of spray system with 
required UAS function 
Many of the hazards in Table 2 are the same as those for conventional aircraft; e.g., loss of sit-
uational awareness and failure to maintain adequate control.  Other hazards are either new func-
tional hazards posed by unique physical attributes of a UAS (e.g., C2 links) or are new functional 
hazards for systems and equipment related to traditionally human-centric functions (e.g., detect 
and avoid (DAA) of other aircraft). New design requirements were proposed in the mock type 
certification basis to mitigate risks posed by these hazards. 
Addressing Hazards through Requirements 
Once the hazards were classified, the next step was to specify design requirements to mitigate 
the hazards. Each paragraph in current standards for normal category rotorcraft (i.e., Part 27 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations)18 and the UAS-tailored version JARUS19 was evaluated for 
applicability to the hazards in Table 2.  Of the 260 regulations in Part 27, only 11 were included 
as written in the certification basis; 119 regulations were excluded outright; 56 were slightly mod-
ified; and 74 were abstracted by intent into three special issue papers on controllabil-
ity/stability/maneuverability, structural integrity, and powerplant.  Those three issue papers re-
interpreted existing requirements into less prescriptive guidance more suitable for UAS.  The cer-
tification basis also included four additional special issue papers that propose requirements for 
hazards not covered in Part 27: (1) vehicle containment within authorized boundaries, (2) DAA of 
other aircraft, (3) DAA of ground-based obstacles, and (4) C2 links.   
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The aim of all of the special issue papers was to draft safety-centric requirements that were 
sufficiently abstract and technology-agnostic, while still providing adequate information to objec-
tively describe the desired system behavior.  This style of requirements is called performance-
based safety objectives.20 This style is in contrast to prescriptive requirements, where a specific 
technology or method is specified to mitigate a hazard.  Performance-based safety objectives are 
generally preferred since they offer increased design flexibility and tradeoffs between design and 
operational limitations.   
Examples of Hazard Mitigations 
To help illustrate the difference between performance-based and prescriptive requirements 
consider two examples from the mock type certification basis.  The first example deals with loss 
of the C2 link.  If the C2 link does not effectively and consistently pass data between the UA and 
the GCS, then the pilot cannot take emergency action when needed: the pilot cannot perform his 
safety role.  The mock certification basis includes an issue paper with proposed performance-
based requirements to mitigate this hazard.  One of those requirements is, “The C2 link shall 
… be available in all vehicle attitudes under all foreseeable operating conditions throughout the 
containment volume…” The requirement does not specify how the link must work, but rather 
specifies the desired outcome, namely that the UA can continue to receive commands from the 
pilot regardless of where it is in the operational area, and independent of its attitude. 
The second example is the loss of (or inadequate) structural integrity, especially of the rotor 
hub and drive system.  This hazard affects normal rotorcraft as well as UA; however, the hazard 
changes in nature.  Rotor integrity is usually a hazard to people onboard a conventional rotorcraft, 
whereas the hazard for a UAS in this agricultural ConOps is the release of high-energy parts that 
could injure flight crew or bystanders.  There is an existing requirement in Part 27.917 to provide 
a unit to disengage the engine from the rest of the rotor system: “Each rotor drive system must 
incorporate a unit for each engine to automatically disengage that engine from the main and aux-
iliary rotors if that engine fails.”18 This is an example of a prescriptive requirement.  Typically 
this requirement is satisfied in normal rotorcraft with the addition of a clutch that disconnects if 
the engine were to seize. Instead of a prescriptive requirement, an associated performance-based 
requirement on the powerplant (i.e., engine and rotor drive system) would establish that high-
energy parts would not be ejected. Compliance with this requirement could entail a series of re-
quirements on the engine, gearing mechanisms, rotor hubs, shafts, bearings, etc.  However, the 
pattern of conventional rotorcraft indicates that most applicants would use a clutch or similar de-
vice.  Therefore, simply mandating that the UAS have a means to disconnect the engine from the 
rotors was preferable. 
RISK ASSESSMENT THROUGH FACTORS 
Various characteristics (or factors) such as kinetic energy8 have been proposed to distinguish 
between the risks inherent in the operation of different types of UAS.  As the NASA study pro-
gressed, it became clear that some characteristics of the UAS and its operation affected overall 
safety risk more than others.  This section examines those factors as a potentially useful way of 
grouping platform-operation pairs that pose a similar system safety risk and for comparing risk 
profiles of different platform-operation pairs.  The factors described here are not comprehensive, 
but provide a preliminary list of characteristics that may facilitate risk assessment.  
Factors Influencing Safety Risk  
Several factors linked to the UAS and its ConOps were notable in their influence over the re-
quirements in the mock type certification basis.  These factors were found to sufficiently embody 
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the pertinent characteristics of the vehicle under the specified ConOps, and directly impact the set 
of requirements.  This led to the observation that these factors could potentially be used to span 
the design space of UAS under a variety of operations—not limited to a precision agriculture ro-
torcraft.  For ease of reference, the factors were divided into two categories: design characteristics 
and operational characteristics.  A plausible range of each factor was determined, and then an ab-
stract scale was postulated over that range, to best characterize the factor’s impact on the derived 
type certification requirements.  Finally, each factor was assessed to determine which hazard was 
foremost in its sphere of influence.    
The design factors primarily concern aspects related to the UAS.  Characteristics such as the 
mass and speed relate to intrinsic physical qualities of the UA.  Pilot remote control authority, 
where the pilot has inner-loop control or outer-loop control, or the operation is autonomous, and 
GCS to UA ratio that allows for multiple GCSs and multiple UAS in the same operation influence 
the disposition of human-machine control authority in the system. 
The operational factors are predominantly derived from the ConOps.  The factor pilot locality 
refers to the how close, both visually and by radio, the pilot or crew is to the UAS.   The pilot can 
be within VLOS or BVLOS, and within RLOS or beyond RLOS (BRLOS).  The VLOS-BRLOS 
value of the locality factor describes an operation that is constrained to VLOS of the observers, 
but may have operational areas where the UA is BRLOS of the GCS. Factors such as population 
density, operational altitude, and air traffic density are fixed by the geospatial location of the op-
eration. The mission duration and visual conditions under which the operation takes place are 
temporal aspects of the type of operation being performed, including both day and night Visual 
Meteorological Conditions (VMC), and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).  The oper-
ational volume, access to overflown area and pilot locality factors are fundamental properties of 
the operation, but also function as constraints.  The operational volume factor describes the air-
space volume that the UA may legitimately occupy; that is, whether the operation requires the 
aircraft to remain in a contained (bounded) volume of airspace.  If the vehicle were allowed to 
access its entire operational space (e.g., full physical range and altitude limits for its mission dura-
tion), the operation would be characterized as “uncontained.”  The access to the overflown area 
factor captures whether ground-based access is allowed.  For example, if access to the operational 
area (e.g., by persons or ground-based vehicles) is under the control of the operation, then access 
is “controlled”.  
These factors are not necessarily independent; for example, air traffic density is often depend-
ent on operational altitude.  Furthermore, the list is not comprehensive; it is a set of factors from 
the NASA study deemed to have a significant impact on the overall system safety risk.  Table 3 
provides a summary of the factors that emerged as dominant influences on system hazards.   
Visualization of the Risk Space 
To appreciate the difference in the safety risk inherent in diverse UA platforms performing a 
variety of operations, a graphical means of displaying the factors can be useful.  Dissimilar plat-
forms performing distinct operations could then be seen to possess similar risk profiles, as the 
coarse discretization of the factors allowed for visual patterns to emerge.  Figure 2 shows the vis-
ualization for the ConOps for the precision agriculture spray operation, indicated in blue and pur-
ple.  The pink blocks are described later. 
These factors help visualize why, for this operation, hull loss of the vehicle, within the opera-
tional volume, is not a safety hazard.  When population density is ‘sparse’, the operational vol-
ume is ‘contained’, and the access to overflown area is ‘controlled’, it is reasonable to assume  
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Table 3. List of Dominant Safety Risk Factors 
Design Factors Range Primary Hazard 
Mass 
Micro (<4.4 lb), Small (<55 lb), Medium 
(<7000 lb), Large (>7000 lb) 
Harm to people 
Operational Speed 
Low Speed, Medium Speed, Subsonic, 
Supersonic 
Harm to people 
Pilot Remote Control 
Authority 
Inner Loop, Outer Loop, Autonomous Interference with crew safety role 
GCS to UA Ratio 0:1, 1:1, 1:n, m:1, m:n Interference with crew safety role 
Operational Factors   
Population Density None, Sparse, Medium, Dense Harm to people 
Operational Altitude <500 ft, <18000 ft, <60000 ft, >60000 ft Degradation of safety margin 
Air Traffic Density  None, Light, Moderate, Heavy Degradation of safety margin 
Mission Duration/ 
Range 
Minutes, Hours, Days, Weeks Harm to people 
Visual Conditions  Day VMC, Night VMC, IMC Interference with crew safety role 
Operational Volume Contained, Uncontained Degradation of safety margin 
Access to Overflown 
Area 
Controlled, Uncontrolled Harm to people 
Pilot locality  
VLOS-RLOS, BVLOS-RLOS, VLOS-
BRLOS, BVLOS-BRLOS 
Interference with crew safety role 
that no people are in the operational volume during operations.  Additionally, when the speed fac-
tor is ‘low’ and the operational altitude is ‘<500 ft’, the impact footprint can be operationally 
specified to always be within the containment volume (with a judicious choice of containment 
volume).  Thus, hull loss (due to ground impact) within the contained operational volume does 
not present a hazard, as no harm is posed to ground based humans.  Note that a hull loss due to 
impact outside the containment volume is accounted for in the “Failure to stay within authorized 
operational area” hazard (see Table 2).  Similarly, hull loss due to impact with another aircraft 
within the containment volume is also considered in the “Failure to detect, alert or warn, and 
avoid intruder aircraft” hazard (see Table 2).   
To see how comparisons are possible, consider a variation of the agricultural ConOps, where a 
midsize unmanned rotorcraft delivers cargo and the aircraft’s route is confined to corridors over 
uncontrolled rural areas. This sort of operation would likely have a longer duration, a higher op-
erational altitude, and require the vehicle to venture BRLOS.  However, if the population density 
of the overflown area is ‘sparse’, the change in risk could be less substantial.  For few people in 
the operational area, the risk of hitting someone on impact is somewhat naturally mitigated, de-
spite the control or lack of control of the overflown area.  Thus, a corridor operation with an un-
controlled overflown area would subsume many of the requirements of a contained operational 
volume and a controlled overflown area operation; though additional attention would have to be 
paid to the fly-away risk if populated areas exist within the possible range of the aircraft.  Such an 
operation is visualized in pink and purple cells in Figure 2. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The NASA study investigated airworthiness requirements for a midsize UAS used for preci-
sion spraying applications and provided some insights on both UAS certification and risk-based 
certification.  The first is that current airworthiness certification processes can be used, with some 
tailoring, as a basis for larger commercial UAS operations, particularly for low-risk use cases. 
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Figure 2. Visualization of Precision Agriculture Application with Rotorcraft 
This can be accomplished without requiring compliance with all of the existing (prescriptive) 
airworthiness regulations applicable to similar conventional aircraft.  The end result is that UAS 
could be certified without compromising the innovative and novel features that make them finan-
cially and operationally attractive.  
Moving toward risk-based certification seems feasible, but will necessitate some fundamental 
changes.  These changes include redefining hazardous conditions for a UAS and explicitly evalu-
ating the hazards associated with the ConOps, instead of relying on the implicit hazards captured 
in the existing regulatory standards.  Performing operational hazard analysis early in a risk-based 
airworthiness process allows airworthiness standards to be tailored to simultaneously maintain 
public safety and not unduly burden the proposed UAS operation.  Basing airworthiness standards 
on a hazard analysis for the designated ConOps allows maintenance of public safety without un-
due burden on the proposed UAS operation.  Performance-based safety objectives will be needed 
for novel systems and equipment including C2 links, containment systems, and systems that can 
DAA situations that pose harm to people, property, or other aircraft.  The NASA study provided 
an initial attempt to draft requirements in that style.  Finally, risk factors will need to be estab-
lished that can distinguish risk profiles among different UAS types and their operations to help 
define the envelope of safe UAS operations. 
Further work is needed to validate the conclusions of the paper especially with regard to the 
applicability of risk factors to other UAS and operations.  Establishing a means to comply with 
the certification requirements would greatly enhance the viability of this approach to risk-based 
certification advocated in this paper. Work is also needed to develop the system architectures, 
requirements, and means of compliance when autonomous capabilities, responsible for safety 
critical functions, are added to the UAS. 
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